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OHIO V. CLARK 
Supreme Court Holds Out-of-Court Statements Made by Child to Preschool 
Teacher Were Not “Testimonial” Statements 
Peter M. Torstensen, Jr.∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Cross-examination has long been considered a vital aspect of a fair 
trial.1  In fact, the Sixth Amendment’s provision that criminal defendants 
“be confronted with the witnesses against [them]” has been held to 
guarantee an opportunity for cross-examination in criminal trials.2  Even in 
cases where the Court has admitted out-of-court statements without cross-
examination, it has adhered closely to the view of cross-examination as a 
core protection of defendants’ rights.3  The fundamental issue regarding the 
relationship between hearsay evidence and the Constitution’s right of 
confrontation is whether and to what extent they pursue similar objectives.  
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court collapsed any distinction between the 
Confrontation Clause and the federal and state hearsay evidence rules, 
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 1  See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (explaining that “[t]he 
substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has 
once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-
examination”); see also 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (declaring cross-
examination “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”). 
 2  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) 
(finding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of cross-examination in criminal 
trials); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (same). 
 3  This was at the core of the Court’s holding in Ohio v. Roberts, which conditioned 
its admission of hearsay evidence by an unavailable declarant on the “indicia of reliability” 
that rendered cross-examination unnecessary.  448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980). 
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holding that the right of confrontation was not offended so long as the 
statements bore sufficient “indicia of reliability.”4  After nearly a quarter-
century of this reliability analysis, the Court changed course, as Roberts 
often admitted hearsay evidence that the Confrontation Clause intended to 
exclude.5  Instead of looking for “indicia of reliability,” the Court now 
considers whether out-of-court statements by an unavailable declarant 
“bear testimony” against the accused—if so, admission of the hearsay 
evidence violates the right of confrontation unless there was a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.6 
Rather than providing an exhaustive definition of “testimonial” 
statements, Crawford v. Washington left the resolution of that issue to 
future cases,7 and the development of an analytical framework for 
testimonial statements has been uneven.8  In an effort to provide clarity to 
the testimonial inquiry, the Court announced in Davis v. Washington what 
has come to be known as the “primary purpose” test, which requires an 
objective inquiry into the purposes of the out-of-court statements being 
offered as evidence.9  However, it is not immediately apparent whose 
primary purpose must be considered,10 as the articulation of the test can 
easily be read to require an inquiry into the purposes of the interrogator or 
the declarant, or both.11  Michigan v. Bryant also added several other 
considerations to the “primary purpose” inquiry,12 which risk complicating 
 
 4  Id.; see KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 892 (8th ed. 
2014) (noting that “Confrontation Clause analysis under Roberts and admission under the 
hearsay rules . . . merged into a single inquiry”). 
 5  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–63 (2004) (arguing that the right of 
confrontation was not intended to be subject to “amorphous notions of ‘reliability’” and 
criticizing Roberts for admitting “core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause 
plainly meant to exclude”). 
 6  Id. at 68; see id. at 51 (finding the Confrontation Clause applicable to statements 
bearing testimony against the accused). 
 7  Id. at 68. 
 8  See David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 115, 136–37 (2012) (arguing that the development of the “testimonial-
nontestimonial” distinction from Crawford may have been uneven, at least in part, because 
it attempts to discern the subjective motivation of the declarant through objective factors). 
 9  See 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  The Court decided Davis and Hammon v. Indiana 
in the same opinion.  Id. at 813.  
 10  See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 368 (2011) (arguing that the problem of 
mixed motives requires an inquiry into both). 
 11  See id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding that neither Crawford nor Davis 
addressed whose perspective was relevant to the “primary purpose” inquiry). 
 12  The Court considered additional factors for determining whether there was an 
ongoing emergency—such as the presence of a weapon, the injuries suffered by a declarant, 
whether there was an interrogation, and the formality surrounding the statements, see id. at 
363–69 (majority opinion)—which has arguably complicated the analysis, see Crump, supra 
note 8, at 136. 
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the analysis of testimonial statements even further.  While Bryant did not 
address the question, reserved in Davis, regarding the effect of statements 
made by a declarant to a private party,13 that situation was squarely 
presented in Ohio v. Clark.14 
I.     CASE FACTS 
Darius Clark, or “Dee,” lived with his girlfriend and her two children 
in Cleveland, Ohio.15  Clark was also his girlfriend’s pimp, and he 
frequently sent her to Washington, D.C. to work as a prostitute.16  In March 
2010, while his girlfriend was on one such trip, Clark was left in charge of 
her three-year-old son, L.P., and eighteen-month-old daughter, A.T.17  The 
following day, L.P.’s teacher noticed that he had a bloodshot eye and red 
lash marks on his face.18  L.P.’s preschool teacher, Ramona Whitley, 
notified the lead teacher, Debra Jones, who asked L.P. about what had 
happened.19  After initially saying he had fallen, L.P. eventually answered 
the questions by saying, “Dee, Dee.”20  Whitley contacted a child abuse 
hotline regarding the suspected abuse.21  When Clark came to pick up L.P. 
from school, “he denied responsibility for the injuries and . . . left with 
L.P.”22  The next day, a social worker went to the Clark residence and took 
the two children to the hospital, where a physician discovered additional 
injuries consistent with child abuse.23  L.P. had a black eye, several belt 
marks, and numerous bruises, while A.T. had two black eyes, a burn mark 
on her cheek, and indications that her pigtails had been ripped out at the 
base.24 
The grand jury indicted Clark for five counts of felonious assault, two 
counts of domestic violence, and two counts of child endangerment.25  At 
trial, the State introduced the out-of-court statements made by L.P. as 
evidence establishing Clark’s guilt, but L.P. did not testify as the Ohio trial 
 
 13  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 357 n.3. 
 14  135 S. Ct. 2173, 2177 (2015). 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id.  
 17  Id. at 2177–78.  The Court noted that it, like the Ohio courts, used initials to refer 
to Clark’s victims.  Id. at 2177 n.1.  
 18  Id. at 2178.  
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id.  
 25  Id.  
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court found him incompetent to testify.26  Under Ohio law, children 
younger than ten years of age are incompetent to testify if they “appear 
incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions 
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.”27  The Ohio 
trial court relied on state evidence rules to admit the out-of-court statements 
made by L.P. to his teacher, finding that they bore adequate indicia of 
reliability.28  Clark moved to exclude the statements made by L.P. to his 
teacher under the Confrontation Clause, but the trial court denied the 
motion, finding that the statements made by L.P. did not implicate the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment.29  The jury found Clark guilty of all 
but one of the assault counts and sentenced him to twenty-eight years’ 
imprisonment.30 
On appeal, the state appellate court reversed the conviction on the 
ground that admission of L.P.’s out-of-court statements violated the 
Confrontation Clause.31  The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of 
the appellate court, albeit on slightly different grounds.32  The court 
determined that L.P.’s statements were testimonial, as the primary purpose 
of the teacher’s questioning was “to gather evidence potentially relevant to 
a subsequent criminal prosecution” rather than “to deal with an existing 
emergency.”33  In addition, the court also found that Ohio had a mandatory 
reporting obligation law, which requires certain professionals, including 
teachers, to report instances of suspected child abuse to the authorities.34  In 
the court’s view, the mandatory reporting obligation transformed the 
teachers into agents of the State, which made the statements they elicited 
from L.P. “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony.”35 
 
 26  State v. Clark, No. 96207, 2011 WL 6780456, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011), 
rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).  The trial court held a hearing on November 16, 2010, and 
found L.P.—then four years old—incompetent to testify.  Id. 
 27  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting OHIO R. EVID. 601(A)). 
 28  See id. (citing OHIO R. EVID. 807). 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id.  
 31  See Clark, 2011 WL 6780456, at *2, *11. 
 32  See State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 600–01 (Ohio 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2173.  
The Ohio Supreme Court found that the primary purpose of both teachers, Jones and 
Whitley, was to collect evidence to fulfill their duty to report abuse.  See id. at 600. 
 33  Id. at 597. 
 34  See id. at 596. 
 35  Id. at 600 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 
(2009)). 
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II.     MAJORITY OPINION 
It is worth noting that this appeared to be an easy case for the Court.36  
It concluded, somewhat narrowly, that the out-of-court statements by L.P. 
to his teacher did not implicate the protections of the Confrontation Clause, 
as the primary purpose of the statements was not testimonial.37  After 
curiously referencing Roberts’ “indicia of reliability” standard,38 the 
majority summarized the Court’s confrontation precedents—beginning 
with Crawford v. Washington and concluding with Michigan v. Bryant.39  
The Court explained that Crawford applied the Confrontation Clause to 
witnesses who bear testimony against the accused, and it defined 
“testimony” as “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 
of establishing or proving some fact.”40  Having defined “testimonial” 
statements, Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the 
introduction of testimonial evidence by witnesses not testifying in court, 
unless they were unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.41 
The Court then reviewed its subsequent confrontation cases—in 
particular Davis v. Washington42 and Michigan v. Bryant43—which have 
further developed the requirements for determining when a statement is 
testimonial.44  It noted that Davis articulated what had come to be known as 
the “primary purpose” test, defining when statements made to police 
officers would—and would not—be testimonial.45  The Court explained: 
 
 36  The Court unanimously found that these statements were not testimonial.  Clark, 
135 S. Ct. at 2183; id. at 2183–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2185 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  But there was strong disagreement in the proper 
reasoning to be applied.  See infra Part III. 
 37  See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183. 
 38  Id. at 2179 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).  The reference is 
curious, in part, because the Court’s decision in Crawford overruled Roberts, and the 
majority opinion referenced Roberts in such a way as to suggest that it was still a viable 
approach.  Compare id. (describing Crawford as a new approach without suggesting that 
Roberts had been overruled), with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) 
(rejecting the Roberts approach), and id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“I dissent from the Court’s decision to overrule . . . Roberts.” (citation omitted)).  
Moreover, subsequent opinions of the Court have expressly recognized that Crawford 
overruled Roberts—it did not simply provide another approach.  See, e.g., Michigan v. 
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 353 (2011) (noting that Crawford overruled Roberts); Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007) (same). 
 39  See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2179–80. 
 40  Id. at 2179 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).  
 41  Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68). 
 42  547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 43  562 U.S. 344.  
 44   Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2179–80. 
 45  Id. (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
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Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.46 
According to the Court, Bryant determined that the “primary purpose” 
inquiry required consideration of “all of the relevant circumstances.”47  
Bryant had reiterated the primary purpose requirements from Davis, but it 
also noted that there might be circumstances beyond those indicating the 
existence of an ongoing emergency that could objectively indicate that a 
statement was not made with the primary purpose of establishing facts for 
future prosecution.48  The Bryant Court considered the existence of an 
ongoing emergency as simply an additional factor informing the ultimate 
“primary purpose” inquiry.49  The Court noted that Bryant also viewed the 
formality of the interrogation as another factor that required consideration, 
noting that informal “questioning [was] less likely to reflect a primary 
purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the accused.”50  
Finally, the Court observed that the Confrontation Clause was not meant to 
preclude admission of those out-of-court statements that were understood at 
the time of the founding to be admissible in criminal trials without cross-
examination.51  Thus, the majority determined “the primary purpose test is 
a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of out-of-
court statements under the Confrontation Clause.”52 
While the Court indicated that this case presented the very question 
that it had reserved in earlier cases—whether out-of-court statements made 
to private persons implicated the Confrontation Clause—it declined to 
adopt a categorical rule excluding out-of-court statements made to private 
persons as beyond the Sixth Amendment’s reach.53  However, the Court 
 
 46  Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).  
 47  Id. at 2180 (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 369).  
 48  Id. (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 374). 
 49  Id. (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366).  Bryant considered additional factors that 
could have a bearing on the inquiry.  See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 371–75 (considering 
circumstances, such as a shooting victim found alone in a parking lot without knowledge of 
the party responsible for the injuries, the fact that the involvement of a gun created an 
additional danger to the public at large, and the purpose of the officers’ questions). 
 50  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 366, 377). 
 51  Id. (citing Giles v. California 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6, 62 (2004)). 
 52  Id. at 2180–81. 
 53  See id. at 2181. 
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found it highly relevant that L.P. was speaking to his teachers.54  
Comparing the facts and circumstances of the instant case with those 
present in Davis, Hammon v. Indiana, and Bryant, the Court determined 
that the primary purpose of the conversation between L.P. and his teacher, 
similar to the conversations in Davis and Bryant, was to respond to an 
ongoing emergency, as opposed to an effort to gather evidence to be used 
in a future prosecution.55  The Court also observed that it was incredibly 
unlikely that a child of his age would ever “intend his statements to be a 
substitute for trial testimony.”56  Finally, the Court found that statements 
similar to those at issue in the instant case had been generally admissible at 
common law.57 
The Court also rejected Clark’s contentions that Ohio’s mandatory 
reporting requirements transformed the statements L.P. made to his 
teachers into testimonial statements, given the “natural tendency [of these 
kinds of statements] to result in [the] prosecution [of a defendant].”58  It 
dismissed this argument for two reasons.  First, the Court found that any 
good teacher would have acted with the primary purpose of removing the 
child from harm’s way, regardless of any state reporting requirement.59  
Second, the Court found it irrelevant that the mandatory reporting 
requirement “had the natural tendency to result in Clark’s prosecution.”60  
It noted that both Davis and Bryant permitted the introduction of statements 
that were provided in response to police interrogations, as their purpose 
was not primarily testimonial.61  The reporting obligation, the Court 
concluded, “does not change our analysis.”62 
III.     CONCURRING OPINIONS 
A.   Justice Scalia Joined by Justice Ginsburg 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the Court’s 
judgment and with its decision to avoid answering two questions 
unnecessary to decide the case: (1) whether the Ohio mandatory reporting 
law transformed private actors into agents of the State for purposes of the 
 
 54  See id. 
 55  See id. (noting that Davis and Bryant both involved circumstances that were 
unclear to the responding officers that required asking questions of the victim to secure their 
safety, while the victim in Hammon had already been separated from her alleged attacker). 
 56  Id. at 2182. 
 57  See id. 
 58  Id. at 2183.  
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
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Confrontation Clause, and (2) whether a more permissive test for 
determining whether a statement is testimonial should apply to 
interrogations by private actors.63  Applying the “usual test applicable to 
informal police interrogation,” Scalia concluded that L.P.’s statements were 
not testimonial.64  In particular, L.P.’s primary purpose in making the 
statements was “not to invoke the coercive machinery of the State,” nor 
were his teachers attempting to “establish[] facts for later prosecution.”65  
Finally, the conversation, viewed as a whole, did not possess the “requisite 
solemnity . . . . adequate to impress upon [L.P.] the importance of what he 
[was] testifying to.”66  This, according to Justice Scalia, was all that was 
necessary to decide the case.67 
As the majority opinion went beyond what he believed was necessary 
to decide the case, Justice Scalia wrote separately to “protest the . . . 
shoveling of fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so 
recently rescued from the grave in Crawford v. Washington.”68  He argued 
that the Court’s recent cases, beginning with Crawford, sought to bring the 
application of the Confrontation Clause back in line with its original 
meaning: testimonial statements by out-of-court witnesses must be 
excluded unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.69  Scalia took issue with the 
characterization of Crawford as a different approach.70  While noting that 
“snide detractions do no harm,” Scalia argued that dicta on legal points has 
a significant potential to mislead.71  In particular, the suggestion that the 
 
 63  Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  While Scalia expressed relief that the 
majority declined to employ a more permissive test for interrogations by private persons, 
there is some reason to believe that in function, if not in form, the Court’s opinion would 
allow just that.  Despite declining to hold statements made to persons who are not police 
officers as categorically beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause, the Court noted that 
“[s]tatements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and 
prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial.”  Id. at 2182 
(majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008)).  
Given the suggestion that statements made to persons who are not police officers are 
unlikely to implicate the Confrontation Clause, it is no stretch to conclude that a more 
permissive test is a likely consequence of the Court’s decision—or a step in that direction.  
 64  Id. at 2183–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 65  Id. at 2184.  
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  See id. 
 70  See id. (“Crawford remains the law.  But when else has the categorical overruling, 
the thorough repudiation, of an earlier line of cases been described as nothing more than 
‘adopt[ing] a different approach,’ as though Crawford is a matter of twiddle-dum twiddle-
dee preference . . . ?” (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 2179 (majority opinion))).  
 71  Id. 
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“primary purpose” test was “necessary, but not always sufficient” had no 
support in the Court’s confrontation case law.72  Instead, he argued, the 
“primary purpose” test sorted out interactions with a police officer where 
an individual was, and was not, acting as a witness.73  In addition, he 
referred to the majority’s assertion that a party seeking the protection of the 
Confrontation Clause must provide “evidence that the adoption of the 
Confrontation Clause was understood to require the exclusion of evidence 
that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the time of the founding.”74  
Scalia argued this was backwards, as the Confrontation Clause was a 
procedural requirement that, once invoked by the defendant, required the 
prosecution to introduce evidence sufficient to establish a longstanding 
practice of admitting evidence of this type without the need for cross-
examination.75  The Court’s opinion, Scalia suggested, appeared to be “an 
attempt to smuggle longstanding hearsay exceptions back into the 
Confrontation Clause.”76 
B.   Justice Thomas 
Despite agreeing with much of the majority’s analysis, Justice Thomas 
wrote separately to highlight the missed opportunity to provide guidance on 
the application of the Confrontation Clause to out-of-court statements made 
to private persons.77  Finding the “primary purpose” test inapplicable,78 
Thomas advocated an approach—also advocated in Davis v. 
Washington79—that “assess[ed] whether [the] statements [bore] sufficient 
indicia of solemnity to qualify as testimonial.”80  Thomas argued that the 
Confrontation Clause was designed to protect against the particular abuses 
 
 72  Id. at 2184–85 (quoting id. at 2180–81 (majority opinion)). 
 73  See id. at 2185.  This assumes the Sixth Amendment operates as a procedural rule, 
as opposed to an evidentiary rule. 
 74  Id. (quoting id. at 2182 (majority opinion)).  
 75  See id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 78  See id. (arguing that “[t]he primary purpose test . . . is just as much ‘an exercise in 
fiction . . . disconnected from history’ for statements made to private persons as it is for 
statements made to agents of law enforcement, if not more so” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment))).   
 79  547 U.S. 813, 836–37 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (advocating an approach to analyze testimonial statements based on 
sufficient indicia of solemnity). 
 80  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2186 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Davis, 547 U.S. at 836–37 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)) (asserting that he would apply 
“the same test for statements to private persons that I have employed for statements to 
agents of law enforcement”). 
156 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 91:3 
that occurred under the English bail and committal statutes—in particular, 
the “use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”81  
Given this history, Thomas asserted that the Confrontation Clause was 
targeted to confront witnesses who bear testimony against the accused, 
where testimony is defined as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”82  Thus, he argued 
that a confrontation analysis should turn, at least in part, on a solemnity 
analysis.83 
IV.     FUTURE BATTLEGROUNDS 
Given the tenor of the Court’s confrontation cases since Davis and its 
recent decision in Clark, it is worth considering the potential battlegrounds 
in future cases attempting to provide needed clarity to the “testimonial” 
framework.  In particular, the Court needs to address (1) the scope of an 
“ongoing emergency,” (2) whose perspective (interrogator or declarant) is 
relevant to the “primary purpose” inquiry, and (3) whether the testimonial 
inquiry changes when evaluating statements made to private individuals.  
Bryant offers some preliminary answers to these issues,84 but they have 
proven less than desirable for lower courts.85  Clark considered creating a 
different test to evaluate statements made to private persons for their 
testimonial or nontestimonial character.86  Ultimately, the Court declined to 
provide a categorical rule, likely due to the fact that the “primary purpose” 
test proved sufficient to resolve the case without resort to an in-depth 
analysis of the identity of the person to whom the statements were made.87  
Each of the aforementioned problems will be considered in turn. 
 
 81  Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 835 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part)).  
 82  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
 83  Justice Thomas referred to certain categories of out-of-court statements that would 
bear adequate indicia of solemnity, which would thus be excluded under the Confrontation 
Clause.  See id.  “Statements ‘contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’ easily qualify.”  Id. (quoting White 
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment)).  In addition, he noted that “formalized dialogue” while in police custody, as 
long as it followed any Miranda warnings, could bear adequate indicia of solemnity to 
qualify as testimonial statements.  Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 840 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 84  Bryant provided a more expansive view of an “ongoing emergency,” see Michigan 
v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359–65 (2011), and concluded that the perspectives of both the 
interrogator and the declarant were relevant, see id. at 367.  
 85  See, e.g., People v. Fackelman, 802 N.W.2d 552, 573 (Mich. 2011) (attributing a 
split decision to the difficulty in “synthesiz[ing] several very-difficult-to-synthesize 
Confrontation Clause decisions of the Supreme Court”). 
 86  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 87  See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
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A.   Ongoing Emergencies and Relevant Perspectives for the Primary 
Purpose Inquiry 
The confrontation jurisprudence in the wake of Crawford—
particularly in Bryant—has not been the model of clarity.88  While Clark 
did not have occasion to consider the scope of ongoing emergencies or the 
proper perspective to consider in a primary purpose inquiry, its casual 
reliance upon the principles from Bryant89 suggests further retrenchment 
from the categorical overruling of Roberts.  Clark did not engage in much 
of an analysis regarding the potential reach of ongoing emergencies, yet it 
found Bryant instructive.  The teachers were concerned with the safety of a 
vulnerable child, the identity of the abuser was unknown, and the teachers 
had no way of knowing whether any other children in their charge might be 
at risk.  Based on these factors, the Court found that the teachers’ questions 
were aimed at resolving an ongoing emergency.90  The real problem with 
ongoing emergencies after Bryant is overinclusiveness—the broader the 
conception of “ongoing emergency,” the narrower the applicability of the 
Confrontation Clause.91  This overinclusiveness could essentially eviscerate 
the right of confrontation, and it is hard to imagine that “[t]he Framers 
could . . . have envisioned such a hollow constitutional guarantee.”92  Such 
a broad view of an ongoing emergency might portend a return to the 
Roberts regime. 
In conducting the primary purpose inquiry, the majority considered 
the perspectives of both the interrogators (L.P.’s preschool teachers) and 
the declarant (L.P.).93  Without much difficulty, the Court concluded that 
the primary purpose of both the teachers and L.P. was to resolve an 
 
 88  See Fackelman, 802 N.W.2d at 573 (referencing the Court’s “tortuous 
[confrontation] jurisprudence”).  
 89  See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).  The Court concluded that L.P.’s 
statements occurred in the midst of an ongoing emergency, see id., but it is not clear that this 
characterization of L.P.’s statements was necessary to the decision.  In particular, the 
existence of an ongoing emergency was not an essential predicate to finding that the 
statements were nontestimonial.  See id. at 2180 (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 374).  In 
addition, the majority considered the perspective of both the declarant and the interrogator, 
see id. at 2181–82, which was the approach suggested in Bryant, see supra note 84. 
 90  See supra note 89.  It is hard to imagine that, in the absence of finding an ongoing 
emergency, the Court would be forced to conclude that L.P.’s statements were made with 
the primary purpose of establishing facts for future prosecution.  Unnecessarily expanding 
the scope of an “ongoing emergency,” however, carries a very real risk of undermining the 
right of confrontation in closer cases. 
 91  See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 387–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s 
definition of “ongoing emergency” had no real limiting principle).  
 92  Id. at 389; see also id. at 388–89 (arguing that the “distorted view” of the Court 
created an “expansive exception” to the right of confrontation, which would not have been 
endorsed by the Framers).  
 93  See supra note 89. 
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ongoing emergency.94  The Court’s evaluation of the perspectives of both 
the interrogator and the declarant appears to further entrench the approach 
taken in Bryant.95  Justice Scalia has argued, however, that the only 
relevant perspective is that of the declarant.96  The Bryant approach created 
no problems in Clark because the motives, at least when viewed through 
the lens of a reasonable person, were aligned.97  However, it is not hard to 
imagine circumstances when a declarant and an interrogator have 
conflicting motives.98  While the Bryant approach does not propose a direct 
solution to this issue, it seems likely that the resolution of these cases 
would be left to the discretion of judges, who would be “free to reach the 
‘fairest’ result under the totality of the circumstances”99—an outcome that 
would be a step back towards Roberts. 
B.   Placing Statements Made to Private Persons Within the “Testimonial” 
Framework 
The Court was unwilling to establish a categorical rule for statements 
made to private persons, but its approach suggests that these statements are 
significantly less likely to implicate the Confrontation Clause.100  In the 
context of out-of-court statements made to police officers, the “primary 
purpose” test functions as a binary approach to the testimonial 
determination.  That is, a statement is either determined to be made for the 
purpose of resolving an ongoing emergency (nontestimonial) or with a 
view towards prosecution (testimonial).101  As the “primary purpose” 
inquiry is an objective one,102 this makes sense.  The police officer stands 
clothed in the compulsory authority of the State, charged with the duty of 
investigating crimes.  When there is not an ongoing emergency, it is quite 
reasonable to assume that police interviews, even those of a more informal 
nature, are likely to be used in future prosecutions.  Statements made to 
private persons, however, are more likely to fall into a hazier middle 
ground—neither made to resolve an ongoing emergency nor made for the 
purpose of future prosecution.  This appears to be an area with great 
 
 94  See supra note 89. 
 95  See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 96  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 97  See Ohio v. Clark, 135 U.S. 2173, 2181–82 (2015) (finding that the primary 
purpose of both L.P. and his teachers was to resolve an ongoing emergency). 
 98  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 383 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99  Id. 
 100  See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 101  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 102  See id. 
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potential for confusion.103  For the time being, however, it appears that the 
“primary purpose” inquiry may be sufficient for the task.  Clarifying its 
confrontation jurisprudence should be a point of emphasis for the Court in 
the near future. 
CONCLUSION 
The heart of the debate over the purpose of the Confrontation Clause 
is the manner in which confrontation was intended to secure a defendant’s 
rights—either through procedural fairness or ensuring evidentiary 
reliability.  The eventual direction the Court takes will depend, in large 
part, on which of these visions of the Confrontation Clause ultimately 
prevails.  Bryant marked a potential step in the direction of the Roberts 
vision, and Clark does not appear to have departed from the course set in 
Bryant.  Thus, while Crawford marked a sea change in the Court’s 
confrontation jurisprudence, the Court’s recent decisions—including 
Clark—appear to have chipped away at Crawford’s categorical holding: 
testimonial statements offered by an unavailable declarant are inadmissible 
unless the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  It 




 103  In this respect, the approach advocated by Justice Thomas is commendable, as it 
would likely make the “testimonial” inquiry much clearer.  See supra notes 77–83 and 
accompanying text. 
